First of all Boeing needs to retrofit all the MAX with the back-up AOA sensor kit, which was an option that most airlines did not fit to save $$$*.
Boeing said one sensor was enough.
First of all Boeing needs to retrofit all the MAX with the back-up AOA sensor kit, which was an option that most airlines did not fit to save $$$*.
Boeing said one sensor was enough.
The thing with MCAS that struck me as a little odd is what a departure this was from Boeing's traditional design philosophy. Boeing's long-standing engineering motto is that the pilot will always get the last word in terms of flight control, so he or she can override safety features in an emergency. This is in contrast to Airbus, which actively limits what the pilot can do, to avoid them inadvertently over-stressing the plane or putting it in a dangerous flight situation.
But the thing with MCAS is that this automated system can override pilot control. Now Boeing disputes this, as they claimed the system can be disabled, but that is only possible if the pilots knew the system was there in the first place. The pilots did not even know the system exist when the Lion Air crashed. It was only afterwards that people began to wonder about MCAS and the pilot unions took Boeing to task for not informing them of the system or providing them with adequate training.
Looks like they might need to get some additional storage.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1TR30JTwo people briefed on the matter told Reuters that an FAA test pilot during a simulator test last week was running scenarios seeking to intentionally activate the MCAS stall-prevention system. During one activation it took an extended period to recover the stabilizer trim system that is used to control the aircraft, the people said.
It was not clear if the situation that resulted in an uncommanded dive can be addressed with a software update or if it is a microprocessor issue that will require a hardware replacement.
What are they playing at? Short-term profits over long-term safety. Boeing's culture historically was very good, with it's strong emphasis on safety. They didn't get to where they are now as a leading aircraft manufacturer by taking a slip-shod attitude with safety. But that all began to change after it merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997. MD brought it's own very aggressive culture to Boeing, that emphasized profit-taking first. So that changed Boeing's culture...for the worst.Original Post Deleted
Even so, why would you let government pilots even get a sniff of the plane unless you were certain all of the issues had been solved?
Because Boeing is under pressure from it's shareholders to get the plane back in the air ASAP. And given the cultural changes to the company, there just wasn't the same kind of safeguard and careful detection of problems that the company used to have.Original Post Deleted
In truth, the MAX should never have been built in the first place. The 737 is a fundamentally robust and well-trusted design, but it is past it's sell-by-date. It's inherent design limitations (i.e. low ground clearance) meant any further modifications would force the engineers to make more and more compromises in trying to fit advanced and modern technology to an essentially 1960's era plane. But Boeing did not want to spend the money on building a brand new plane from scratch. They just want to quickly get the plane on the market to starve off competition from Airbus's A320neo. Hence certain flaws in the design of the MAX was overlooked.
This would never have happened with the old Boeing, which was always led by engineers and not bean-counters. While the current CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, is an engineer by training, he answers to bean-counters all the same.